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Human beings should live in places where they are most productive, 
and megacities, where information, innovation, and opportunities 
congregate, would be the optimal choice. Yet megacities in both China and 
the United States are excluding people by limiting the housing supply. Why, 
despite their many differences, is the same type of exclusion happening in 
both Chinese and U.S. megacities? Urban law and policy scholars argue 
that Not-In-My-Back-Yard (“NIMBY”) homeowners are taking over 
megacities in the U.S. and hindering housing development. They pin their 
hopes on an efficient growth machine that makes sure “above all, nothing 
gets in the way of building.” Yet the growth-dominated megacities of China 
demonstrate that relying on business and political elites to provide 
affordable housing is a false hope. Our comparative study of the 
homeowner-dominated megacities of the U.S. and growth-dominated 
megacities of China demonstrates that the origin of exclusionary 
megacities is not a choice between growth elites and homeowners, but the 
exclusionary nature of property rights. Our study reveals that megacities in 
the two countries share a property-centered approach, which prioritizes 
the maximization of existing property interests and neglects the interests of 
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the ultimate consumers of housing, resulting in housing that is 
unaffordable. Giving housing consumers a voice in land use control and 
urban governance becomes the last resort to counteract this result. This 
comparative study shows that the conventional triangular framework of 
land use—comprising government, developers, and homeowners—is 
incomplete, and argues for a citizenship-based approach to urban 
governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 “To add 45 feet, no matter what you put in it—you could put Mother 
Theresa in it—it still is a too-tall building.”  
—Elizabeth Ashby, Co-Chair, Manhattan Community Board1 
“[S]trengthen the population control targets through land supply” 
—Outline of Shanghai Master Plan (2015–2040)2 
Human beings should live in places where they are most productive, 
and megacities, 3  where information, innovation, and opportunities 
congregate, would be the optimal choice.4 Yet megacities in both China 
and the United States are excluding people by limiting housing supply. In 
the U.S., New York City “has lost a net 529,000 domestic migrants” from 
2010 to 2015, in large part due to its high housing costs.5 In San Francisco, 
housing production has long failed to match the city’s economic growth, 
with only 11,000 units added to its housing stock from 2009 to 2015, a 
period in which the city added over 123,000 new jobs.6 In China, city 
governments in both Beijing and Shanghai have reduced the supply of 
residential land to control population, resulting in reduced speed of 
population growth in Beijing and population outflow in Shanghai since 
2016.7  
1. Abigail Savitch-Lew, How Are NYC’s Community Boards Reacting to de Blasio’s Housing 
Proposals?, CITY LIMITS (Nov. 2, 2015), http://citylimits.org/2015/11/02/how-are-nycs-community-
boards-reacting-to-de-blasios-housing-proposals. 
2. “以用地供给强化人口调控目标，以产业结构调整优化人口结构，以适宜的人口密度调
节人口分布” [“To strengthen the population control targets through land supply; to optimize the 
population structure through readjustment of the industrial structure; to regulate the population 
distribution through appropriate population density.”]. See LEADING GROUP OFFICE OF SHANGHAI 
MASTER PLAN, 上海市城市总体规划  (2015–2040）纲要概要  [OUTLINE OF SHANGHAI URBAN 
MASTER PLAN (2015–2040)] 11 (2015), http://img.thupdi.com/news/2016/01/1453791519864576.pdf. 
3. “Megacity” is a term widely used and accepted but rarely precisely defined. In this Article, 
we use the term to refer to first-tier cities in China, represented by Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, 
and the biggest cities in the U.S., represented by New York City and San Francisco. 
4. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011). 
5. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin, The Cities Americans Are Thronging to and Fleeing, FORBES (Oct. 6, 
2015, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2015/10/06/the-cities-americans-are-
thronging-to-and-fleeing. 
6. BAY AREA COUNCIL ECON. INST., SOLVING THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY CRISIS: HOW
POLICIES CHANGE THE NUMBER OF SAN FRANCISCO HOUSEHOLDS BURDENED BY HOUSING COSTS 5 
(2016), http://www.bayareaeconomy.org/files/pdf/BACEI_Housing_10_2016.pdf [hereinafter HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY]. 
7. See, e.g., 何苗 [He Miao], 外来常住人口首现 15 万净流出：谁离开了上海？[150,000 Net 
Outflow of Migrant Permanent Resident Population: Who Leaves Shanghai?], 21 JINGJI (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2016-03/02/content_33343.htm; 北京楼市，真的遭遇大利空了吗？
[Is the Real Estate Market in Beijing Running out of Interests?], IFENG NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 6:17 PM), 
http://wemedia.ifeng.com/9158923/wemedia.shtml; 李迅雷 [Lee Thunder], 人口流向出现逆转，它将
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Why, despite their many differences, is the same type of exclusion 
happening in these two countries? The two countries are fundamentally 
different in land ownership regimes, land use regulations, and urban 
governance. Urban law and policy scholars in the U.S. are concerned that 
Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) homeowners are taking over big cities 
and hindering housing development therein, thereby excluding lower-
income and younger populations from the opportunities that those cities 
offer.8 Explicit or implicit in their research is hope for an efficient growth 
machine that makes sure “above all, nothing gets in the way of building.”9  
From an American perspective, growth-oriented elites in cities, including 
land developers and urban politicians, profit through the increasing 
intensification of land us10 Governments in Chinese megacities monopolize 
land supply, manipulate land use controls, and centralize decision-making 
processes to promote growth. Such governments would be an ideal for the 
above American urban law and policy scholars. If their theory about the 
urban growth machine was correct, however, there should have been no 
housing shortage in super growth-focused cities in China. Why do 
megacities in China also limit housing supply?   
Our comparative study of the homeowner-dominated megacities of the 
U.S. 11  and growth-dominated megacities of China 12  demonstrates that 
 
对中国经济产生怎样的影响？[How Will the Phenomenon of Reverse Population Flow Affect the 
Economy in China?], SOHU (Apr. 25, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://www.sohu.com/a/136422828_481642. 
 8. See generally Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking 
the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David 
Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011) [hereinafter Hills & 
Schleicher, Balancing]; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 91 (2015) [hereainafter Hills & Schleicher, Planning]; John Mangin, The New 
Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91 (2014); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 
YALE L.J. 1670 (2013); Urban Land: Space and the City, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647614-poor-land-use-worlds-greatest-cities-carries-huge-
cost-space-and-city (“Lifting all the barriers to urban growth in America could raise the country’s GDP 
by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1 trillion–2 trillion.”); Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of 
Econ. Advisers, Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents, 
Remarks at the Urban Institute (Nov. 20, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/page/files/20151120_barriers_shared_growth_land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf. 
 9. Edward L. Glaeser, Houston, New York Has a Problem, CITY J., https://www.city-
journal.org/html/houston-new-york-has-problem-13102.html (Summer 2008). See Been et al., supra 
note 8; Hills & Schleicher, Balancing, supra note 8; Schleicher, supra note 8. On the other hand, 
scholars are also concerned about local governments being captured by mobile capital. See generally 
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009). 
 10. See generally Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy 
of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976). 
 11. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Rise of Homevoters: How OPEC and Earth Day Created 
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relying on business and political elites to provide affordable housing is a 
false hope. Homeowners do not generally look favorably on newcomers to 
a city who demand housing and public services, but do not have 
sufficiently deep pockets to purchase an apartment. Neither do growth-
oriented city governments that control resources and have the capacity to 
make and implement whatever policies they deem to be pro-growth. This 
Article argues that the growth-machine-versus-homevoter13 debate shares 
the same incomplete framework of urban governance, giving no voice to 
city residents who own no property or businesses, and it calls for citizen-
based urban governance to replace property-based urban governance. The 
Article also furthers that debate by comparing land use controls and 
development processes in the U.S. and China. At first glance, the two 
countries appear fundamentally different in the way they approach such 
issues.  
In the U.S., land use decisions have a democratic basis and involve 
numerous parties, including neighboring property owners, community 
advocates, appointed and elected officials, and real estate developers. 
Although many groups engage in the decision-making process, as housing 
costs in many American cities have increased in recent years, policymakers 
have become concerned that the end result is restrictive zoning rules that 
limit mobility and exacerbate income inequality. 14  Many community 
advocates have expressed concern that local zoning decision-making 
processes are complex, inefficient, and lacking in transparency, and, as a 
result, they prevent needed development.15 Zoning amendments, a major 
step in real estate development, have frequently been locked into what 
David Schleicher and Roderick Hills call “one by one” piecemeal 
bargaining, dominated by NIMBY property owners.16 
China presents a very different picture of land use control. There, land 
 
Growth-Control Zoning that Derailed the Growth Machine, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN 
HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 13 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017); Been et al., supra 
note 8; Schleicher, supra note 8. 
 12. See generally Xiaoyi Sun & Ronggui Huang, Extension of State-Led Growth Coalition and 
Grassroots Management: A Case Study of Shanghai, 52 URB. AFF. REV. 917 (2016); Lei Wang, 
Forging Growth by Governing the Market in Reform-Era Urban China, 41 CITIES 187 (2014); Lin Ye, 
State-Led Metropolitan Governance in China: Making Integrated City Regions, 41 CITIES 200 (2014); 
Sumei Zhang, Land-Centered Urban Politics in Transitional China—Can They Be Explained by 
Growth Machine Theory?, 41 CITIES 179 (2014). 
 13. For a discussion of the term “homevoter,” see infra text accompanying note 47. 
 14. Furman, supra note 8. 
 15. Mangin, supra note 8.  
 16. Schleicher, supra note 8 at 1706–07.  
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use regulations are administratively driven.17 The general public has only 
nominal rights to participate in the zoning process. Land use power is 
concentrated at the city administration level under the command of a strong 
city leader. As a result, city governments can make zoning amendments 
quickly, with little input from the public.18 However, the Chinese central 
government, urban planning officials, professionals, and scholars have 
exposed significant problems within this “efficient” system and argued that 
the lack of public participation is endangering the legitimacy of zoning in 
China and contributing to an inefficient housing market.19 The Chinese real 
estate market exhibits a combination of skyrocketing prices in the country’s 
megacities, which results in the exclusion of middle- and low-income 
populations (as well as the denial of employment and social opportunities) 
and housing oversupply in its smaller cities, as symbolized by the 
numerous “ghost cities” dotting the landscape.20 In this Article, we focus 
on housing shortages in Chinese and American megacities. 
Although there are major differences between the Chinese and 
American land use systems, they share the phenomenon of high housing 
prices becoming a new instrument by which to exclude poorer populations 
from megacities. China’s megacities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen, have seen demand outpace net new construction since the turn 
 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. Id.  
 19. See, e.g., Ye, supra note 12 at 189–90. See generally 罗鹏飞 [Luo Pengfei], 关于城市规划
公众参与的反思及机制构建 [Reflections on the Public Participation in Urban Planning and Its 
Mechanism Construction], 6 城市问题 [URB. PROBLEMS] 32 (2012). 
 20. A defining characteristic of the Chinese housing market is the undersupply of housing in 
megacities and oversupply of housing in smaller cities. See generally Jing Wu et al., Evaluating the 
Risk of Chinese Housing Markets: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 39 CHINA ECON. REV. 
91 (2016). Looking at the bigger picture of nationwide housing demand and supply, both China and the 
U.S. share a mismatch between housing supply and job opportunities. “[L]ocal governments with the 
weakest economies have been the most aggressive in promoting new housing supply, perhaps as a 
means of generating economic growth, while local governments in the richest cities have been slowing 
down construction.” Edward Glaeser et al., A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics, 31 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 93, 98 (2017). See also Hanming Fang et al., Demystifying the Chinese Housing Boom, 
30 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 2015 105, 152–53 (“There is still a lack of systematic 
understanding of housing supply in Chinese cities. To the extent that housing prices have been rising at 
a pace comparable to or even higher than the households’ income growth rate during the decade, the 
housing market equilibrium implies that the growth of housing supply was likely to have stayed either 
below or comparable to the growth of housing demand . . . .”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, 
Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese 
Communist Party?, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 168–69 (2017); Mali Chivakul et al., 
Understanding Residential Real Estate in China 18 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/84, 
2015) (“For China, Tier I cities are close to the average levels in advanced economies, while smaller 
cities already see a much higher level, suggesting possible signs of oversupply.”). 
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of the century.21 According to joint research by Joe Gyourko, Yongheng 
Deng, and Jing Wu, from 2001 to 2014, the housing supply was just 87% 
of projected demand in Beijing, 70% in Shanghai, and 73% in Shenzhen.22 
In the U.S., there are more than two “extremely low income and very low 
income households” for every one housing unit affordable to them in New 
York City.23 The lack of affordable housing in San Francisco has pushed 
families out of the job market and the city.24 In both the U.S. and China, 
procedural obstacles and the biases of (public and private) property owners 
are obstructing housing development and reinforcing real estate 
developers’ inherent inclination toward the construction of expensive 
housing. The result is a limited supply of new construction, which, when 
combined with continued demand growth from new residents, has led to 
significant increases in the cost of housing in megacities. 25  Traditional 
exclusionary zoning approaches have been used to keep certain populations 
out of attractive communities and to prevent them from accessing decent 
affordable housing. For example, racial covenants were used in the U.S. 
until after the Second World War,26 and the hukou residency registration 
system has a long history in China.27 As exclusionary policies came under 
attack in the U.S., more subtle forms of regulatory exclusion took hold in 
the suburbs, the types of processes that led to the Mount Laurel decisions 
and government intervention.28 In the twenty-first century, traditional forms 
of exclusionary zoning continue, and cities are witnessing a growth in 
 
 21. Wu et al., supra note 20, at 5–6. 
 22. See id. at 60 (“Market-level analysis of short- and longer-run changes in supply-demand 
balances finds important variation across markets. In the major East region markets of Beijing, 
Hangzhou, Shanghai and Shenzhen which have experienced very high rates of real price growth, we 
estimate that the growth in households demanding housing units has outpaced new construction since 
the turn of the century. However, there are a dozen large markets, primarily in the interior of the 
country, in which new housing production has outpaced household growth by at least 30% and another 
eight in which it did so by at least 10%.”). Id. at 2. 
 23. Our Current Affordable Housing Crisis, N.Y.C. HOUSING, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ 
housing/problem/problem.page (last visited July 4, 2017). 
 24. HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 6, at 4. 
 25. Furman, supra note 8, at 5–6. As discussed in Part IC, the richest cities are often megacities 
which occupy unique and monopoly positions on the market of places, and, therefore, tend to 
undersupply housing to grab monopoly rents.  
 26. See, e.g., RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: 
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013). 
 27. See generally FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION AND EXCLUSION: CHINA’S 
HUKOU SYSTEM (2005). 
 28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 21–23 (2013). See also S. 
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cty. 
NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
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obstacles to new development through the processes described in this 
Article.29 It is particularly surprising to see such obstacles in China, where, 
despite driving the world’s most effective growth machine over the past 
three decades, housing prices in the country’s megacities have skyrocketed. 
Why have two such different land use regimes led to a similar form of 
exclusion? We argue that, despite their different decision-making 
processes, the development regimes of both countries share an urban 
governance framework that neglects the voices of the have-nots and is 
premised on the drive to maximize the value of land for current owners, 
thereby leading to discrimination against the interests of middle- and low-
income populations.30 We use the Chinese case to demonstrate that, even in 
super-growth-focused cities, decision-making can lead to exclusion if the 
politics of urban governance are centered on land value maximization for 
current owners. The root cause of exclusionary cities is urban governance 
regimes that prioritize property owners’ interests and voices, at the core of 
which lies the right to exclude. A fundamental lesson is that urban 
governance is not only about land or capital,31 but also about labor and 
housing consumers, the neglect of whose interests leads to inefficiency and 
exclusion. 
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part I lays out 
the basic differences of property and political markets between Chinese and 
American megacities and reveals that despite fundamental differences in 
land institutions and urban governance, landowners dominate both markets; 
housing consumers’ voices are weak or zero in both kinds of megacities. 
Part II examines the origin and structure of zoning in American megacities, 
focusing on the growth-machine-versus-homevoter hypothesis, exploring 
the ways in which zoning processes have become increasingly contested 
and the impact of conflicts over development in American megacities. 
Drawing on the example of New York City, it then demonstrates that even 
in megacities where developers would be expected to have influence, 
property owners dominate zoning processes, leading to the exclusion of 
middle- and low-income populations. Part III examines urban governance 
in Chinese megacities, revealing an alliance between government and 
developers, as well as the growing influence of property owners. We argue 
 
 29. Mangin, supra note 8, at 92. 
 30. This paper does not address the relationship between city governments and upper-level 
governments, which can impact housing supply too. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home 
Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003). 
 31. Schragger, supra note 9, at 485. 
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that this alliance has led to skyrocketing prices in Chinese megacities, 
which exclude middle- and low-income populations. The Chinese case 
reveals that growth-machine elites’ interests are not necessarily in alliance 
with a greater housing supply. Finally, Part IV concludes by examining the 
convergence of both American and Chinese megacities towards exclusion 
and proposes to replace the current property-centered urban governance 
with a citizenship-based approach to make megacities more affordable and 
inclusive. 
I.  CONCEPTUALIZING LAND USE IN TWO MEGACITIES: 
PROPERTY AND POLITICAL MARKETS 
In both the United States and China, supply and demand decide the 
final land use, and land institutions (i.e., land ownership regimes and land 
use regulations) shape both supply and demand. Therefore, to 
conceptualize land use in China and the U.S., we need to understand not 
only their property markets, but also the political markets of urban 
governance. The most interesting aspect of this comparison is that, despite 
fundamental differences in land institutions and urban governance, 
landowners dominate both markets, and consumers’ voices are weak in 
both Chinese and American megacities. More specifically, American 
megacity politics are dominated by existing property owners, whereas in 
Chinese megacities, the government, as the sole land owner, prioritizes 
industrial development and favors high housing prices over satiating 
demand. As a result, land use processes in both China and the U.S. 
prioritize property owners’ voices and neglect the needs and demands of 
the have-nots and newcomers to big cities. 
A.  PROPERTY MARKET: STATE MONOPOLY VS. HOMEOWNERS’ 
MONOPOLY 
In China, city governments monopolize land supply and are 
incentivized to undersupply residential land to grab monopoly rents from 
consumers. In U.S. cities, the real estate industry is much more 
competitive. Yet, with the institution of zoning, the supply of housing can 
be restricted by monopolistic practices. Empirical studies have shown that 
such monopolistic supply restriction is widespread., originally in suburbs 
and now even in megacities. In other words, since “zoning power within an 
urban area is sufficiently concentrated” amongst local homeowners and 
their representatives, the “supply of housing [in such areas has been] below 
[optimal], and its price above, those which would prevail in competitive 
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equilibrium with no zoning.”32 State and homeowner monopolies over the 
property market are the defining characteristic of land use in China and the 
U.S., respectively. We can proceed to more detailed description of the two 
systems with this defining characteristic established. 
To compare land use approaches in China and the U.S., it is necessary 
to clarify the concept of zoning and, more fundamentally, the function of 
land use regulations. Each society’s understanding of property rights is 
crucial to its conception of zoning, and China and the U.S. differ greatly in 
their fundamental understanding of both property rights and zoning. The 
historic understanding of property rights in the U.S is captured by the 
phrases “the title of our lands is free, clear, and absolute”33 and “every 
proprietor of land is a prince in his own domain.”34 In other words, private 
property owners have wide latitude in determining the uses of their 
property. Although property ownership has always been subject to 
government regulation in the U.S., the libertarian view captured by the 
foregoing phrases has shaped the legal rules governing the strength of 
private property rights and the limited role of the government in 
determining those rights. The primary justification for zoning in the U.S., 
as represented by the Euclid decision, is the need to prevent negative 
externalities that may result from individual land use decisions.35 The goal 
of the zoning rules developed to regulate land use was to prevent any 
interference with the rights of neighboring property owners: i.e., the 
government plays the role of regulator to protect private property 
interests.36 However, the problem with a land use system based on private 
property rights is that “housing owners can employ growth controls to 
cartelize housing supply.”37 “If consumer demand for residency in a [place] 
is not completely elastic,” which is always the case in megacities, 
homeowners’ interests are allied with limiting housing supply to maintain 
 
 32. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. URB. ECON. 116, 116 
(1978). See also William A. Fischel, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power: A Reevaluation, 8 J. 
URB. ECON. 283 (1980); James A. Thorson, An Examination of the Monopoly Zoning Hypothesis, 72 
LAND ECON. 43 (1996). 
 33. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 5 
(2011). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926). 
 36. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid, 
5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 286–87 (1996). 
 37. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE 
L.J. 385, 400 (1977). 
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or even increase the market value of existing housing.38 
In contrast, local governments in China are the primary land owners 
and suppliers within their jurisdictions. Zoning is a recent concept, adopted 
as part of the country’s market reforms. Historically, the government has 
controlled land directly through ownership.39  Urban planning is a more 
commonly used term than zoning in China, and it follows the economic 
planning tradition. It is a powerful weapon for local governments to 
achieve their city management objectives. In the planned economy period, 
land use decisions were part of development decisions.40 The central and 
local governments formulated five-year economic development plans, 
implemented through a variety of projects. The governments controlled the 
plans for such projects, including their locations, how much land to use, 
and what facilities needed to be built. Hence, land use decisions were not 
independent, but rather part of, and inferior to, overall project decisions.41 
The strength of such economic plans was the centralized decision-
making process, whereby the government determined the appropriate land 
use and made decisions concerning individual land parcels by taking into 
account the overall development picture. The problems with such 
centralized planning are also obvious, including the potential misallocation 
of resources and neglect of individual interests. The market reforms 
launched in the 1980s dismantled the planned economy, resulting in 
various economic activities being freed from central government control. 
China promulgated its first urban planning law in December 1989, making 
urban planning permits a separate requirement in the land use permit 
system.42 In the years since, urban planning in China has gradually moved 
in the direction of American-style land use regulations, with the further 
retreat of government power from economic activities and the expansion of 
individual property rights. Today, the government plays a dual role in the 
development of land: it is both the primary land supplier and the land use 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: Partial Reform, Vested Interests, and Small 
Property, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 70, 75 (2015). 
 40. Id. at 82 
 41. Id. at 78 (“It was clear from the RRLSC that all land use must be consistent with the State’s 
economic plan.”). The Chinese system is in many ways similar to that of cities in early United States. 
See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870 (G. Edward White ed., 1983).  
 42. See 中华人民共和国城市规划法 [City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Apr. 1, 1990, 
invalidated by the Urban and Rural Planning Law, Oct. 28, 2007), art. 31, translated in 1987–1989 
P.R.C. LAWS 349 (describing the application process for a construction project in a planned urban area). 
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regulator. As the primary land supplier, the government is able to define 
the scope and content of individual land use rights in land use assignment 
contracts with individual land users.43 It can then further regulate individual 
land uses through its regulatory power, similar to the power of local 
governments in the U.S. 
The U.S. and Chinese systems started from very different, almost 
polar, positions, with the former focused on private rights and the latter on 
government privilege, but over time the number of similarities between the 
two have increased. Land use control in China originated in the planned 
economy, as noted, with the state exercising control over land as both land 
owner and economic planner. However, with the ongoing shift toward 
private property ownership, the government’s power to shape development 
has become more circumscribed. In the U.S., the land use system began 
with little government intervention, but over time the government’s role 
gradually increased, and today local governments play a meaningful role in 
directing development. These two different, but converging, frameworks 
have shaped the development process in both countries. Nevertheless, the 
government monopoly of the land market is still the defining characteristic 
of land use control in China. In the U.S., as discussed in more detail in the 
following section, homeowners also cartelize housing supply through their 
control of city governments. A monopolized market does not generate 
optimal housing, regardless of which entities are doing the monopolizing.44 
B.  POLITICAL MARKET: GROWTH MACHINE VS. HOMEVOTERS 
Urban governance has long been described as a war between growth 
elites, such as land developers, and homeowners, who are also voters. In 
1976, Harvey Molotch coined the term “growth machine” to describe the 
efforts of the former group: 
A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal 
expression of the interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen 
to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area 
in which its members hold a common interest. An elite competes with 
other land-based elites in an effort to have growth-inducing resources 
invested within its own area as opposed to that of another. Governmental 
authority, at the local and nonlocal levels, is utilized to assist in 
 
 43. Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Land Law: Stick by Stick?, in PRIVATE LAW IN 
CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 182, 191–95 (Yun-Chien Chang, Wei Shen & 
Wen-Yeu Wang eds., 2017). 
 44. See Hamilton, supra note 32, at 116. 
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achieving this growth at the expense of competing localities. Conditions 
of community life are largely a consequence of the social, economic, and 
political forces embodied in this growth machine.45 
In the same article, Molotch speculated that “the political and 
economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American 
context, is growth.”46 However, also in the 1970s, homeowners began to 
erode the power of the pro-development growth machine coalition. 
According to William Fischel:  
[U]nprecedented peacetime inflation, touched off by the oil cartel OPEC, 
combined with longstanding federal tax privileges to transform owner-
occupied houses into growth stocks. The inability to insure the newfound 
value of their homes converted homeowners into “homevoters,” whose 
local political behavior focused on preventing development that might 
devalue their homes.47  
Originally, this occurred in the suburbs, but recently homevoters have also 
begun to overtake the growth machine in big cities.48 
A typical land use dispute is therefore a drama featuring three main 
players: the developer (the main actor in the growth machine), neighbors 
(i.e., neighboring homeowners, along with, in U.S. megacities, the renters 
whose neighborhood longevity has created a vested interest), and the local 
government. The developer “triggers the dispute” by proposing to carry out 
a controversial activity. 49  The neighbors of the land under dispute 
constitute “the developer’s first and main line of opposition.”50 The local 
government in whose jurisdiction the land is located is then the “principal 
institution” tasked with “reconciling the competing interests” of the two 
other parties.51 This triangular framework dominates discussions of land 
use disputes in both land use casebooks52 and law review articles.53 The 
way in which the framework unfolds depends on the decision-making 
mechanisms, which can be simplified into three models.  
The first can be called the “omniscient dictator” model. Land use 
 
 45. Molotch, supra note 10, at 309. 
 46. Id. at 309–10. 
 47. Fischel, supra note 11, at 1. 
 48. Been et al., supra note 8, at 229; Schleicher, supra note 8, at 1682–83. 
 49. ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 73 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. See, e.g., Been et al., supra note 8, at 228; Schleicher, supra note 8, at 1676–77. 
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decisions are made by a dictator who has the ability to costlessly determine 
the relative value of different land use arrangements. The second model is a 
more democratic or majoritarian model, in which proposals are accepted or 
rejected by some sort of majority vote by a representative decision-making 
body. At first blush, land use decisions in China fall under the dictator 
model, with an authoritarian local government deciding what is appropriate 
and individual property owners lacking any say in the matter, whereas 
those in the U.S. fall under the democratic model, as the mayors and city 
councils making decisions are elected, and zoning decisions are often 
subject to a democratic vote. 
However, neither model provides an ultimate answer to the question 
of who decides which projects go forward. In the Chinese dictator model, 
we still need to determine what the dictator considers in making decisions, 
whereas in the American democratic model, we still need to determine 
what constitutes a majority. This is where the third model, the “influence 
model,” comes in. The Chinese “dictator” does not have all of the 
information necessary to make land use decisions, and thus decisions are 
based on various policy considerations as influenced by a range of 
interested parties, including real estate developers but also industrial land 
users and neighboring homeowners, who cannot vote but who can exercise 
influence in other ways. 54  In the American democratic model, what 
constitutes a majority is a difficult question to answer, as a small number of 
property owners often wield disproportionate influence, with the views of 
other members of the community neglected. City councilors make 
decisions with imperfect information and under the influence of various 
interests. Accordingly, the influence model explains land use decisions in 
both China and the U.S. better than either the omniscient dictator or 
democratic models. 
Throughout U.S. history, homeowners were not against development 
when they themselves were part of the growth machine and benefited from 
additional development. According to Fischel, the rise of suburban 
America and the separation of home from work led to the NIMBY 
movement, resulting in the displacement of the growth machine. 55 
Homeowners concerned about the value of their property, and the 
 
 54. See, e.g., Thomas Johnson, Environmentalism and NIMBYism in China: Promoting a Rules-
Based Approach to Public Participation, 19 ENVTL. POL. 430, 430–31 (2010); Yi Sun, Facilitating 
Generation of Local Knowledge Using a Collaborative Initiator: A NIMBY Case in Guangzhou, China, 
46 HABITAT INT'L. 130, 131–32 (2015). 
       55.    Fischel, supra note 11, at 4–8. 
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homeowners associations that represent them, took control of local 
governments, exercising a dominant influence in zoning decisions.56  In 
China, by contrast, homeowners are not particularly powerful, although 
their influence is growing in conjunction with their rise in both numbers 
and power. Chinese cities are also considered super growth machines, and 
thus pro-development, although that has not prevented them from 
becoming exclusionary. 
Land use decisions are subject to the dynamics of the political market, 
which, as Douglass North wrote, concern “the underlying rules that are the 
incentive structure of an economy—property rights, contracting, and 
credible commitment.” 57  North further highlighted two problems in 
political markets. The first is that there may be imperfect information and 
cognition—that is, one must ask how well the representatives of various 
interests know their interests and whether “the collective outcome [is] 
rational, in the sense that policies could have been devised that rendered all 
concerned better off.”58 Correcting for this, Hills and Schleicher argued that 
local governments can combat NIMBYism through comprehensive city-
wide plans, ensuring that the potential burden of new development is 
widely shared.59 Residents do not oppose all new construction, they pointed 
out. Rather, they worry that they will be forced to accept more than their 
neighborhood’s “fair share.”60 To combat homeowners’ strong aversion to 
development in their neighborhoods, Hills and Schleicher proposed a 
budget zoning system that renders the overall costs to individual 
neighborhoods much more visible. To address the same problem, Fennell 
proposed decoupling the investment volatility associated with off-site 
influences on housing from the homeowner’s bundle,61  whereas Fischel 
proposed “reduc[ing] the tax advantages of homeownership” and 
“equaliz[ing] the tax treatment of capital gains from housing with that of 
other assets.”62 Albeit through different means, all these scholars try to 
 
 56. Id. at 4–6. 
 57. Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355, 356–
57 (1990). 
 58. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of Controls: American 
Sugar 38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2504, 1988). 
 59. Hills & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 8, at 95. See also Hills & Schleicher, Balancing, 
supra note 8, at 89–90. 
 60. Hills & Schleicher, Balancing, supra note 8, at 102 (“[N]o legislator will vote to allow a new 
development in her district unless she can be sure everyone else will reciprocate by taking their fair 
share of the housing needed to meet demand.”). 
 61. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (2008). 
 62. Fischel, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
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address homeowners’ concerns about property values and their strong 
aversion to development. 
The second problem highlighted by North is credible commitment: 
constituents vote for representatives who commit to protecting their 
interests—indeed, Fischel’s confidence in homevoters requires the 
assumption that city councilors are bound by their commitments63—but 
representatives may later be captured by interest groups and fail to honor 
their commitments. 64  The growth machine hypothesis falls into this 
category: city councilors and urban planning officials violate their 
commitments to homevoters and decide in favor of growth elites instead. 
Under this theory, growth elites distort the political market, leading to 
inefficiency.  
Contracting costs or transaction costs are another problem. Hills and 
Schleicher argue that “decentralized” and “lot-by-lot” zoning decisions 
impede development by raising developers’ costs of lobbying for still more 
development.65 The solution, they averred, is to elevate zoning decisions to 
a city-wide system.66 A comprehensive and binding plan would both ensure 
credible commitment—through a package deal guaranteeing community 
representatives on city councils that their constituents will not bear 
disproportionate burdens—and also greatly reduce transaction costs.67 This 
idea of metropolitan urban planning derives from the long-standing U.S. 
debate over planning versus zoning, dating back to as early as the 1950s.68 
American cities have never taken comprehensive plans seriously, despite 
academics advocating for such plans. 69  But Chinese cities have well-
designed comprehensive plans. The making of such plans proves to be 
more challenging than academics imagine, and their effect is more limited 
than academics expect.70 Would comprehensive plans work in New York 
City or San Francisco? We do not know for sure. Do comprehensive plans 
 
 63. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 4. 
 64. North, supra note 57, at 357–60, 363–64. 
 65. Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, supra note 8, at 95. 
 66. See id. at 94–95 (arguing for “centralized” plans). 
 67. See id. at 92. 
 68. See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 353, 365–66 (1955). See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning 
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 69. See Hills & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 8, at 102–04. 
 70. See generally Wing-Shing Tang, Chinese Urban Planning at Fifty: An Assessment of the 
Planning Theory Literature, 14 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 347 (2000). 
  
2018] EXCLUSIONARY MEGACITIES 483 
 
work in Beijing or Shanghai? By the standard of providing affordable 
housing, the answer is no!—they are instrumental in reducing, rather than 
increasing, affordable housing. Either way, though, whether to use 
comprehensive plans or piecemeal deal-making is a secondary question for 
those who participate in the decision-making process. 
That leaves us with the preliminary question to any bargaining: the 
initial allocation of property rights. Defining who is entitled to what is a 
precondition of any market exchange, and political transactions are no 
exception. Property rights on the political market mean entitlement to 
political bargaining. In both the American and Chinese cases, the power of 
property owners outweighs the influence of others in the decision-making 
process.71  Even with the above proposals in place, housing is likely to 
continue to be the most important investment that most people make, and 
homeowners’ interests will remain aligned with less development and 
against competition for public resources from outsiders. If the political 
market for urban governance does not check homeowners’ growth-control 
tendencies, any reform measures will likely be of only limited effect. 
Fischel actually concedes that his proposals may only “slow down the 
growth of growth controls, not reverse them.”72 As far as non-property 
owners who have no direct access to political bargaining, their interests 
would not be reflected and protected by a property-dominated political 
market. This is a fundamental problem. 
To summarize, the failure of the political markets of urban governance 
in China and the U.S. cannot be attributed solely to the property owners’ 
information and cognition insufficiency, the high transaction costs in 
decentralized decision-making, or the challenge to community 
representatives to make credible commitments to each other. Entitlement to 
political bargaining is the first question we need to solve before reaching a 
more detailed institutional design. 
C.  THE VOICELESSNESS OF HOUSING CONSUMERS IN MEGACITIES 
There is a fundamental limitation in the aforementioned development 
triangle in both jurisdictions: it only partially incorporates the interests of 
the ultimate consumers of the activity in question, i.e., the potential buyers 
and renters of the housing to be developed. More specifically, Robert 
Ellickson identified the housing consumers who suffer from exclusionary 
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land use controls, including: “(1) current tenants who like [a city] too much 
to want to move out . . . ; and (2) all households that move into [a city] in 
the future;” as well as (3) “tenants who subsequently leave the municipality 
because their rents go up; and [(4)] potential immigrants to [a city] who 
have decided not to buy or rent there simply because of the price increase 
caused by the antigrowth policies.”73 
In megacities in both China and the U.S., land use decisions are made 
without full consideration of the ultimate housing consumers, and, in 
practice, those consumers are rarely sufficiently organized to exert any 
influence on land use decisions74 and are given few opportunities to voice 
their concerns. Theoretically, housing suppliers should care about the 
ultimate consumers, and therefore speak for them in the process of making 
land use decisions. However, profit-maximizing developers prefer building 
more expensive and therefore more profitable housing and are far from 
perfect proxies for the interests of housing consumers. They are rarely 
interested in lobbying for middle- and low-income populations, from which 
they cannot draw sufficient profits to justify their expenses (particularly in 
areas with high construction and regulatory costs), 75  which is why 
governments in both jurisdictions often require developers to build 
affordable housing, a phenomenon that in certain situations is defined as 
constitutionally controversial exaction.76  So-called “inclusionary housing 
programs” are designed to counterbalance the exclusionary effects of 
developer-driven markets. Although who ultimately bears the costs of 
exaction is highly debatable, the underlying consensus on the exclusionary 
nature of real estate development is solid.77  
Democratic local governments in the U.S. are supposed to represent 
the interests of middle- and low-income populations; municipal 
corporations are different from business corporations in the sense that they 
allow “one person one vote” rather than “one acre one vote.” 78 
Nevertheless, the country’s long tradition of municipal corporations 
strongly favors homevoters. The individuals who are truly able to influence 
 
 73. Ellickson, supra note 37, at 402. 
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the zoning process are normally property owners, who vote at higher rates 
than others and express their preferences more robustly.79  Authoritarian 
local governments in China monopolize primary land markets in their cities 
and rely on land sales revenue as a major source of their revenue.80 They 
are motivated to keep land prices and therefore housing prices high.81 
In short, property ownership prevails in both the Chinese and 
American zoning processes. In this Article, we examine the functions and 
mechanisms of land use regulations and role of public participation in both 
jurisdictions to demonstrate the dominating influence of property 
ownership in urban governance. 
If there is no change to the fundamental character of urban land 
governance shared by these two countries’ megacities, such cities will 
continue to be exclusionary. Exclusion is not necessarily inefficient or 
unfair per se. Property owners do have a legitimate claim to preserving 
their particular living styles and values through land use controls.82 But 
such controls should be evaluated in a larger social context, beyond 
property owners’ interests and values. When an exclusionary community is 
fungible, i.e., when there are plenty of location options from which 
consumers can choose, exclusionary policies are tolerable. 83  However, 
megacities are not fungible. They are the economic and cultural centers of 
the whole nation and occupy unique, monopolizing positions in the market 
of places. In such a situation, housing consumers cannot simply exercise 
their right to exit in order to discipline megacity governments. When they 
do leave, they may suffer a loss of better career opportunities—the 
population flow from coastal cities to Texas is an example84— and when 
they do not leave, they either pay higher rents or suffer from much poorer 
living environments. “Ant tribes” in Beijing—people living in crowded, 
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 81. See supra Section I.A. 
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 83. Id. at 430. 
 84. See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 9 (“To East Coast urbanites, Houston’s appeal must be 
mysterious: the city isn’t all that economically productive—earnings per employee in Manhattan are 
almost double those in Houston.”); Kotkin, supra note 5 (“The nation’s three largest metropolitan areas 
fall to the bottom of our list: Los Angeles (46th), Chicago (52nd) and, in last place New York. Since 
2010, the New York metro area has lost a net 529,000 domestic migrants, adding to the 1.9 million who 
departed from 2000 to 2009.”). Cf. id. (“[S]everal Texas cities . . . have logged strong job 
growth . . . .”). 
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underground spaces85—are examples of this. 
Moreover, some proposals assume that real estate developers are 
appropriate proxies for the needs of future consumers. 86  However, real 
estate development in megacities is expensive—in capital, risk, and time—
which pushes developers to focus on projects that promise the highest 
return: namely, those that produce more expensive housing. In and of itself, 
unleashing the market—albeit important—will not fully resolve this 
problem. In theory, filtering, a process whereby “higher income households 
move on,” with the “homes or apartments they formerly occupied . . . 
[being] sold or rented to people with more modest incomes,” generates a 
large amount of housing stock affordable to middle- and low-income 
populations.87 In a 2014 article, though, Stuart Rosenthal rigorously tested 
the filtering effect and found considerable variation in different parts of the 
U.S. 88  He noted in particular that severe restrictions on new housing 
construction have significantly slowed down the filtering process in coastal 
regions.89 
Since the market of places cannot effectively discipline megacity 
governments, everybody, including property owners and consumers, is to 
some extent trapped in such unique locations, and improving urban 
governance is the only solution. In the highly monopolized political and 
property markets, the ultimate consumers who are residents or potential 
residents of megacities are voiceless. Those who care most about 
affordable housing have no representatives, and thus their interests are 
sacrificed, resulting in an inadequate housing supply in both American and 
Chinese megacities. Inefficient land use regulations persist because they 
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serve the interests of growth elites (in China) and/or homevoters (in the 
U.S.). In both cases, those without property pay the price of exclusion. 
* * * 
In summary, despite their fundamentally different origins, the land use 
regimes in both Chinese and American cities can be understood as 
examples of the influence model, wherein different parties with conflicting 
interests exert influence over land use decisions. First appearances suggest 
that the U.S. and Chinese regimes remain fundamentally different, with 
property owners dominant in the former, and growth elites in the latter. 
However, once we link urban governance with property rights, the two 
jurisdictions begin to appear more similar than different: urban governance 
in both jurisdictions is based on the pursuit of value maximization by 
property rights owners. In the Chinese context, a slight caveat is needed: 
the government is the primary land owner, and thus plays a major role, 
while rising middle-class homeowners play a minor role. The young, 
middle-, and low-income populations that own no property are severely 
underrepresented in, if not totally absent from, the political market of urban 
governance in both jurisdictions. In the following sections, we present 
detailed analyses of both regimes. 
II.  LAND USE IN AMERICAN MEGACITIES: CONCEPT, 
MECHANISM, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
American property law evinces a strong disposition toward property 
owners. Protection of private property from government incursion has been 
an important legal principle since the framing of the Constitution. Although 
the history of American law can be interpreted as one of increasing 
government influence over private property, the rights of property owners 
to control the uses of their property remain strong. 90  The U.S. zoning 
system must be understood in the context of this framework. However, 
reliance on the “sanctity of private property” is not helpful when the 
activities of one property owner impact the enjoyment of another property 
owner. The zoning system emerged to mediate this tension. Over the course 
a century of zoning law, the system has come to encompass much more 
than just a framework to mediate disputes between individual property 
owners.91 Zoning shapes the communities in which Americans live, work, 
 
 90. See FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 215 (“After zoning was established, however, the suburbs did 
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and play. It shapes social interactions and strongly influences the 
opportunities to which individuals have access. As a result, zoning 
decisions are among the most contested legal disputes in the country.92 As 
this Part will argue, in recent years, policymakers have expressed 
increasing concern over the dominant role that the zoning system plays in 
America’s economic and social life. No place exemplifies these tensions 
better than the country’s largest city, New York. 
This Part is organized as follows: Section A briefly describes the 
historic roots of U.S. zoning law, focusing on the role of zoning rules to 
supplement and add further protection for private property owners in the 
context of industrialization. Section B discusses the changes in the 
sociopolitical context in which development happens in the U.S., arguing 
that the growth machine has, in general, given way to anti-development 
sentiment in urbanized areas. Finally, Section C focuses on New York City 
as a place that is struggling to balance public involvement in zoning 
decisions with the need to increase the amount of affordable housing in the 
city. New York’s example reveals the very high obstacles facing efforts to 
make American cities (at least those experiencing growth) more inclusive. 
A.  ZONING AGAINST NUISANCE 
Before the twentieth century, land use disputes were resolved as 
private actions among property owners.93 This system worked fairly well 
until industrialization and urbanization dramatically increased the types and 
intensities of land use and disrupted traditional legal relations. Facing 
escalating tensions over the appropriate uses of property, American zoning 
law built on nineteenth-century nuisance law, which granted property 
owners protections against the acts of neighbors that affected the 
enjoyment of their property. 94  Property owners at common law often 
claimed damages from noxious activities in their vicinity, and nuisance 
claims were, until the early twentieth century, the predominant means by 
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which property owners protected their rights.95 
As American urbanization increased, many cities built upon these 
common law rules with legislative provisions protecting property owners 
against damage from their neighbors’ acts.96 Industrialization created many 
new noxious uses, however, and great increases in the population density of 
American cities resulted in many more nuisance disputes. Governments 
struggled to balance their desire to promote development with their 
responsibility to protect property, and they experimented with different 
approaches.97 Often the rules granted property owners the right to prohibit a 
nuisance use unless the property owner obtained from adjacent neighbors a 
majority (or supermajority) of votes approving the activity. Among the first 
of these laws was Chicago’s, which prohibited several noxious uses, such 
as livery stables, unless approved by a majority of the neighbors. 98 
Chicago’s law, as well as many others, was attacked as both too restrictive 
and an inappropriate delegation of government power, but courts generally 
ruled that these approaches were proper.99 
Zoning law did not replace private law protections but rather emerged 
out of them. Zoning was a more “efficient” way to make community-based 
decisions about appropriate urban land uses. The basic principle of zoning 
was that urban “zones” separated industrial, commercial, and residential 
uses, while also differentiating amongst the types of residential use.100 This 
separation of uses protected the public interest and property rights, 
providing security to property owners that their interests would not be 
damaged by the acts of one another. At the same time, the provision for 
different types of uses ensured that cities could continue to grow and 
prosper. Under modern zoning, industrial uses also received protection 
from the nuisance claims of adjacent property owners. Confident in the 
security of their operations, owners of industrial concerns could continue to 
expand their efforts.101 
 
 95. Ellickson, supra note 93, at 721–22. 
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Under this new zoning regime, the decision of where to place different 
uses was often made by professionals who had studied the most efficient 
ways to allocate land uses and who developed “comprehensive plan[s]” for 
urban areas that protected the public and promoted economic growth.102 
These comprehensive plans were made with the input of the public, 
particularly property owners. Both the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
(“SSZEA”) and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (“SCPEA”)—the 
land-use frameworks developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 
the 1920s and promoted around the country—required public input in the 
development of comprehensive plans. 103  This requirement was in 
accordance with Progressive Era principles of citizen engagement, which 
envisioned an enlightened citizenry, led by professionals, who would 
provide meaningful input to guide the public interest.104 
While comprehensive plans were made with public input, the public’s 
role in the daily operations of the zoning process was less clear. Under the 
act, most localities created Zoning Boards of Adjustment (“ZBA”) to 
administer the system.105  The role of the ZBA was to hear exceptional 
cases, where a property owner wanted to use property in a manner not in 
accordance with the zoning code.106 ZBAs were envisioned as professional 
organizations that would objectively determine whether developments met 
the legal requirements specified under the zoning code for a variance from 
the general rules. 107  Early zoning advocates believed that planning 
principles could be developed that would promote the public interest, and 
that once these principles were applied to a city it could follow its natural 
development.108 As a result, public participation in the variance process 
was not strictly necessary, although the SSZEA does provide that “all 
meetings of the board shall be open to the public,” any person “aggrieved” 
by the acts of a ZBA may appeal its decisions, and any aggrieved person, 
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taxpayer, or city official may sue over “illegal” ZBA actions.109 
The original zoning acts were vague about the role of the public in the 
zoning adjustment process itself, though, as advocates believed there would 
be few variances because plans would accurately capture neighborhood 
demands and the goals of the market.110 In addition, any needed variances 
would be granted by professionals well-versed in planning and zoning.111 
Of course, this objective vision of the planning process came quickly under 
assault, with ZBAs the locus of heated battles amongst stakeholders over 
the appropriate uses of property.112 As a result, over the last fifty years the 
zoning system has struggled to balance demands for transparent and 
legitimate decision-making with the desire for efficient operations to 
promote development. 
B.  HOMEVOTERS: NOT IN MY BACKYARD 
The zoning system in the United States is approximately one hundred 
years old. That history can be fairly neatly divided into to two equal 
periods. These names of these two eras—first the “Growth Machine,” 
followed by “NIMBY” (“Not In My Back Yard”)—succinctly encapsulate 
the continuing challenge of balancing competing interests in the land use 
system. 
From the 1920s until the 1970s, the Growth Machine framework 
predominated in American cities and their suburbs. 113  Throughout the 
country, housing and economic development were seen as almost 
unqualified positives. Local governments organized around the generally 
agreed-upon desire for growth. In the post-World War II era, suburban 
development in the United States skyrocketed, as did the percentage of the 
American population living in those areas. 114  Fearing the loss of 
population, business, and, therefore, tax revenues, city governments across 
the country undertook large-scale efforts to reorganize and make 
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themselves attractive to development.115 During the “urban renewal era,” 
which reached its height in the 1950s and 1960s, cities cleared large swaths 
of land, uprooting their residents and partnering with private developers to 
build modern residential and commercial facilities.116 They also rebuilt the 
urban infrastructure, creating the modern urban highway system (which 
uprooted even more people than housing and commercial developments).117 
Most of this activity occurred with little public involvement. 
Government officials, real estate developers, urban planners, and other 
elites made these decisions and presented them to the public as faits 
accomplis. This public acquiescence started to change in the 1960s, with 
increasing public protests over highway and other clearance proposals, and 
accelerated greatly in the 1970s when, as William Fischel argues, 
suburban-citizen revolts over growth added to the objections to urban 
renewal.118 The result of this public outrage was that zoning dynamics were 
radically altered, and for the past fifty years land use regulation has been 
among the most hotly contested of public topics.119 
Each year, thousands of neighbors, and others, appear before zoning 
boards to voice support or, more commonly, opposition to zoning changes 
or special exceptions/variances regarding specific development projects.120 
Generally, this is a post-1970 phenomenon. Before the advent of modern 
neighborhood organizations, most zoning board meetings were sleepy 
affairs. 121  However, the backlash against urban renewal and highway 
programs (along with other types of neighborhood activism) resulted in a 
significant increase in neighborhood organizations, and much of the focus 
of these groups was on preventing or at least shaping development. 122 
Neighbors frequently fight against projects that would increase density, 
affect parking availability, or change neighborhood aesthetics and culture. 
Their goal is to prevent or at least slow neighborhood development, and, 
overall, these efforts are successful. 123  For example, in San Francisco, 
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despite the significant demand for housing, neighborhood insistence upon 
regulations to limit density severely restricts new development. In 2011, 
the city, which has among the highest housing costs in the country, “added 
just 269 housing units.”124 
Because of their crucial role in shaping new development, zoning 
boards also became the prime venue in which to fight neighborhood racial 
and social change, both in the cities and the suburbs. As Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. showed, by 
the 1960s, zoning regulations were an effective means of racial 
exclusion,125  and the past forty years, the citizens of New Jersey have 
debated the 1975 Mt. Laurel decision, which required suburban 
governments to adjust their land use regulations to provide for the 
construction of affordable housing.126 No issue in the state has been more 
contentious over this period,127 and there and in many other states, local 
governments are organized around the desire to exclude certain populations 
and uses.128 
Because opponents of development play such a significant role in the 
zoning process, several states have attempted to regulate their participation. 
Some, such as Minnesota, are skeptical about neighborhood influence and 
consider neighbor opposition a factor in determining the (ir)rationality of 
zoning board decisions.129 But, in general, local governments have wide 
latitude to control the shape, scope, and population of their communities 
through land use regulation. Many legal practitioners, developers, and 
academics have come to criticize the “neighborhood veto” for its role in 
impeding development and exacerbating related economic and racial 
segregation. As Michael Lewyn argues, “This ‘neighborhood veto’ 
sometimes artificially reduces housing supply and urban density, thus 
making housing more expensive and making American cities more 
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dependent on automobiles.”130 However, opposition to new development is 
the dominant position in much of the country. 
C.  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (AND REFORMS): THE EXAMPLE OF NEW YORK 
CITY 
To many observers, New York City is the quintessential example of a 
“growth machine” city. Real estate development has always played a 
central role in the city’s economic life. The real estate sector is one of the 
largest in the urban economy, and real estate was, and is, the foundation of 
many of the city’s largest fortunes.131 Real estate developers in New York 
City have had a major influence on the shape of the city as well as its 
politics and culture. Few cities did more during the urban renewal era to 
reshape themselves to be even more responsive to modern commercial and 
residential development. New York’s master builder Robert Moses—“The 
Power Broker”—remains for many the face of urban redevelopment.132 
However, New York is and always has been a city of neighborhoods, and 
those neighborhoods have frequently pushed back against development. 
Today, as in many times previous, the growth machine and the 
neighborhoods are at odds. 133  As with many aspects of this city, the 
struggle has implications for land use conflicts elsewhere. 
Given that it was the first city to pass a zoning law, it is not surprising 
that New York also has the most developed structure for community 
participation in land use. In 1951, Manhattan Borough President Robert 
Wagner created a series of neighborhood advisory boards to help him make 
decisions on land use and development, and these “Community Planning 
Boards” were incorporated into the city planning structure with the passage 
of the revised city charter of 1963.134 Updated in 1968 and again in 1975, 
the city created fifty-nine community planning boards, each of which has 
authority to develop comprehensive plans for their district or parts of it.135 
Appointed by the Borough President, each board can have up to fifty 
members. The boards also have authority to “cooperate and consult with 
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local administrators of city departments and agencies,” and “to cooperate 
with other boards on matters of common concern.”136 Under the Uniform 
Land Use Review Procedure (“ULURP”), also created in 1975, community 
boards have sixty days to review and make a recommendation on any 
development project that is required to have approval of the borough 
president. Community board recommendations are only “advisory” and do 
not have any legal weight either in the planning process or upon the 
decision of the borough president.137 
Over the years, community planning boards have been criticized both 
for being too influential in preventing development and for being 
ineffective representatives of the community against powerful development 
interests.138 Critics have also raised questions about the qualifications of 
community board members and the representativeness of boards.139 While, 
in theory, community boards can develop comprehensive plans, the budgets 
provided for these organizations do not support such efforts, and many 
boards have had to raise outside funding to support their activities. Not 
surprisingly, studies have found that community planning boards in 
wealthy neighborhoods have higher capacity and more influence than those 
in poorer neighborhoods.140 
But the influence of community boards has definitely increased over 
time, as was particularly evident during the neighborhood rezonings 
initiated by the administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg. From the 
beginning of Bloomberg’s term in 2002, the administration, arguing that 
the city’s zoning resolution—dating to 1961—was outdated, undertook 
more than 100 neighborhood rezonings, with the goal of modernizing the 
regulations in these districts to make them more responsive to community 
needs and development trends. 141  In most of these rezonings, the 
community planning board played a central role, and, in general, that role 
was to protect the neighborhood against higher-density development. In a 
comprehensive study of this initiative, Vicki Been and her colleagues 
concluded that while the totality of the rezonings resulted in a city-wide 
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1.7% residential capacity increase, more parcels were “down-zoned,” to 
place greater restrictions on potential future development, than the number 
of parcels that were “up-zoned.”142 Furthermore, many of the parcels that 
were down-zoned were in areas close to mass transit or other amenities 
that, under “smart growth” principles, made them appropriate for higher-
density development. 143  The result in many neighborhoods was that 
properties that could have been used to meet increased housing demand in 
the city were, at least temporarily, removed from the potential development 
inventory. 
Like many other U.S. cities, New York currently faces a significant 
housing affordability problem. A significant percentage of the population 
pays more than half of their income for housing. 144  While the city is 
experiencing a development boom, almost all of the new housing is for the 
highest income residents. In Manhattan the average sale price for a one 
bedroom apartment exceeds $1 million. 145  Unmet housing demand has 
resulted in a dramatic increase in housing prices in many parts of the city, 
and developers looking to meet that need have increased construction in 
previously-ignored neighborhoods.146 A recent analysis of housing in the 
city determined that 34.3% of city neighborhoods were experiencing 
gentrification.147 
Long major political issues, housing costs and neighborhood changes 
were central to New York’s 2013 mayoral election. During his campaign, 
Mayor Bill de Blasio gave great attention to the city’s housing shortage 
City, specifically the lack of affordable housing to support the city’s poor 
and working-class residents. 148  A year after his election, de Blasio 
 
 142. Id. at 252. 
 143. Id. at 252–253 (“[D]ownzoned lots were more likely to be located near . . . rail stations than 
the typical lot located outside a rezoning project study area.”). 
 144. See Rachel Sugar, More than Half of New Yorkers Are Rent Burdened: Study, CURBED (Dec. 
15, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2016/12/15/13967302/new-yorkers-cost-burden-rental-
market-apartment-list. 
 145. Amy X. Wang, The Average Manhattan Apartment Now Costs $1 Million, QUARTZ, (Oct. 1, 
2015), https://qz.com/515524/the-average-manhattan-apartment-now-costs-1-million. 
 146. NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2015 
43 & fig.4 (2016), http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb3/downloads/resources/NYUFurmanCenter_ 
SOCin2015_9JUNE2016.pdf. 
 147. Id. at 5. The study defined gentrified neighborhoods as “sub-borough areas (SBAs) . . . that 
were low-income in 1990 and experienced rent growth above the median SBA rent growth between 
1990 and 2010–2014.” Id. at 4. 
 148. See, e.g., Henry Goldman, De Blasio Re-Election Bid Stresses Affordability, Not Inequality, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-31/de-
blasio-re-election-bid-stresses-affordability-not-inequality. 
  
2018] EXCLUSIONARY MEGACITIES 497 
 
introduced a major housing plan, proposing initiatives to develop and/or 
preserve 200,000 units of affordable housing.149 The program, controversial 
from its introduction, included a wide variety of approaches to the 
challenge of affordable housing, including: (1) funding programs for 
renovation and construction of new housing; (2) “inclusionary zoning” 
requirements for developers, giving them “density bonuses” for including 
affordable housing in projects; and (3) zoning law changes to eliminate 
barriers to development and allow for higher-density development in some 
areas.150 Among the areas of regulation the administration proposed to re-
examine were “parking requirements, zoning envelope constraints, and 
restrictions on the transferability of development rights.”151 
Mayor de Blasio’s housing plan was immediately criticized by 
affordable housing advocates, who complained that it did not produce 
enough housing for low-income citizens and that the inclusionary zoning 
requirements did not demand enough from real estate developers.152 The 
plan was also criticized by community planning boards across the city, 
many of whom were concerned by the impact that higher-density 
development would have on their communities. 153  “We want a mixed-
income population . . . . We want parking for the seniors and for any new 
buildings coming in,” stated a community board chair in the Bronx, 
echoing concerns expressed by many regarding the impact of new 
development. 154  Further, the Queens borough president stated that 
community boards in many neighborhoods were worried that allowing 
more development would result in the conversion of existing affordable 
housing and dislocate current residents.155 According to one paper: 
Community meetings have turned long and contentious, sometimes with 
dozens of residents lining up to testify against the proposal. The 
opposition ranges from concerns that more development will 
bring gentrification and higher real estate costs that would displace some 
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longtime residents to complaints that more density will overwhelm the 
transit and school systems.156 
More than three-quarters of the city’s community boards, and all five 
of the borough boards (consisting of the chairs of the community boards 
and political leaders) opposed de Blasio’s original plan.157 Much of the 
opposition focused on fears of higher-density development, loss of parking, 
and neighborhood change. As a member of Community District 8 in 
Queens stated, “[w]e are very concerned, as are people all over, that we do 
not become a high-density neighborhood, full of people and crowds.”158 
“To add 45 feet, no matter what you put in it—-you could put Mother 
Theresa in it—-it still is a too-tall building,” said the co-chair of 
Community Board 8 in Manhattan.159 
In low-income neighborhoods, particularly those of color, community 
leaders expressed concern that the mayor’s plan was a mechanism to open 
their communities to gentrification and racial change. State Assemblyman 
Charles Barron argued:  
They’re going to tell you that unless there’s a diversity of incomes, we’re 
not going to be able to build our economy. What this means, translated? 
You need white folks down here. If you want to have an economy, you 
need white folk here. If you want to get transit stuff, you need white folk 
to come in. If you want to get a new school, you need white folk to come 
in . . . They want to make this place look better, to gentrify it.160 
In the end, despite the no votes of a majority of community planning 
boards, the New York City Council approved an amended proposal in 
2016. The revised proposal met some of the criticisms of the original, 
significantly increasing developers’ inclusionary zoning requirements and 
altering the income levels for new-housing eligibility. The de Blasio 
administration organized a vocal and influential coalition of labor 
organizations and advocacy groups to argue that the proposal would 
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significantly increase the amount of affordable housing in the city.161 
But the fight against increased density and other zoning reforms is far 
from over. In order to spur housing development, the administration must 
now undertake the task of “re-zoning” individual neighborhoods for new 
development. Community planning boards will have more opportunities to 
oppose these plans. Although the first rezoning, in the East New York 
section of Brooklyn, was approved, the administration will continue to face 
significant challenges managing public participation in the process of 
zoning approval.162 
Opposition to increased density has also stalled housing plans in 
Seattle and San Francisco, two cities with among the highest housing costs 
in the country. In Seattle, Mayor Ed Murray had to disavow his 
administration’s draft housing plan, which proposed allowing multi-family 
dwellings in many of the city’s single-family zones.163 In San Francisco, a 
plan by Mayor Ed Lee, permitting developers to build two stories higher 
than zoning allowed in return for making 30 percent of the units affordable 
for middle-income families, also faced significant opposition from 
neighborhood advocates.164 
America’s largest cities play an outsized role in the U.S. economy, 
with “[t]he combined annual gross product of the country’s 10 largest 
metropolitan areas [being] greater than the combined GDP of 36 states.”165 
Between 2012 and 2015, more than 90 percent of the new jobs created in 
the country were located in its largest urban areas.166 As a result of this 
economic power, migration to these areas will continue, and thus they will 
also continue to be challenged by housing shortages. At the same time, 
growth pressures will continue to play a major role in urban politics, as 
current residents push back against new development. Developing 
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Brooklyn’s East New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 20, 2016, 10:20 PM), 
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https://www.pressreader.com/usa/san-francisco-chronicle-late-edition/20160225/282226599798937. 
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GOVBEAT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://wapo.st/1hQ3JZs. 
 166. Id. 
  
500 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:467 
 
mechanisms to support additional housing, particularly for low- and 
middle-income residents, is crucial to the success of America’s largest 
cities, and it is a problem that must be confronted by restructuring the 
spheres of influence in the land regulatory system. 
III.  LAND USE IN CHINESE CITIES: CONCEPT, MECHANISM, AND 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
As in the U.S., urban planning in China has contributed to the 
exclusion of middle- and low-income populations from first-tier cities—
Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen in particular. The urban planning policy is 
pro-growth and business-friendly, but not necessarily pro-consumer. As the 
primary landowner, city governments are the major players in the Chinese 
real estate market. Although middle- and low-income populations provide 
the labor upon which cities rely, local government preferences are for 
profit-making and revenue-generating businesses, and their reluctance to 
provide public goods (e.g., education, health care, and transportation) to 
serve those populations has shaped government priorities and resulted in 
housing shortages. 
Government-led, property-owner-focused planning has excluded the 
poor and the young from the first-tier cities in which the most promising 
career opportunities are concentrated. Primarily, and most directly, poor 
and young people cannot afford to live in big cities. City governments also 
squeeze them out by limiting their access to schools, health care, and other 
services. Secondarily, skyrocketing housing prices have fostered private 
property consciousness in China, with private property owners—somewhat 
ironically—joining the governments’ efforts to exclude newcomers, partly 
because of perceived competition for services. Furthermore, like their 
counterparts in American megacities, property owners are increasingly 
sensitive to property value changes. The NIMBY phenomenon has come to 
China! 
The remainder of this Part is structured as follows. Section A sketches 
out the concept and structure of urban planning in China and discusses how 
it has become a powerful weapon in the hands of growth machine elites. 
Section B discusses the establishment of urban planning commissions, with 
members from outside the government, as an effort to democratize the 
decision-making process, as well as the limitations of this initiative. 
Finally, Section C discusses the rise of public participation in Chinese 
urban planning and describes how democratization has made Chinese 
megacities more exclusionary. The three factors have combined to promote 
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exclusion in Chinese megacities. 
A.  PLANNING FOR GROWTH (FOR SOME) 
Leading political scientists and economists refer to China’s 
governmental structure as “market-preserving federalism.” 167  Under the 
country’s economic reforms, city and county governments have been given 
greater autonomy and incentives to manage their own economies, with 
competition encouraged among them. City and county governments rely on 
two financial resources: enterprise income tax and land sale revenue.168 The 
enterprise revenue framework makes industrial development the top 
priority of Chinese cities. The land sale framework, which links the 
operation of local governments to their ability to sell land at high prices, 
pushes government decisions toward high-value projects, resulting in 
exclusion. 
The urban planning structure in China is complicated, but it can 
generally be divided into two layers: a comprehensive or “master plan,” 
and a detailed plan.169 “The master plan outlines the general land uses of 
the city, while the detailed plan is prepared for the area that faces 
immediate construction or is specified in the master plan,” and is similar to 
zoning in American cities.170 The comprehensive plans of megacities such 
as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are prepared by city governments and 
approved by the State Council (i.e., the Chinese central government).171 
Under party leadership, decisions are made by city leaders—usually the 
city party secretary and mayor—in consultation with other government 
officials, urban planning experts, and related business interests.172 Detailed 
plans govern individual land use decisions and are prepared by the urban 
planning administration and approved by the city government.173 
Comprehensive city plans are more akin to economic plans, 
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(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tongji University) (on file with author). 
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incorporating strategic positioning, industrial development, population 
control, infrastructure construction, and other priorities over a twenty-year 
horizon.174 In China, such plans are always growth-oriented. For example, 
the Shanghai City Master Plan (1999–2020) includes sixteen sections 
covering the scope of city development, goals, directions, industrial 
development, transportation, and residential development plans.175 The goal 
of city development, according to the plan, is to make Shanghai an 
international center for finance and trade, and urban planning is directed 
toward achieving that goal.176  The comprehensive plans of Beijing and 
Shenzhen share a similar structure and a clear focus on economic and city 
growth.177 
Together, these comprehensive and detailed plans determine who can 
live in Chinese megacities, and they focus on attracting highly educated 
professionals such as engineers, lawyers, investors, and investment 
bankers.178 Those with fewer skills enjoy limited provision in the plans 
because local governments set population control goals that are often too 
low. For example, in its comprehensive plan for 2004–2020, the Beijing 
municipal government planned for a total population of 18 million by 
2020. 179  However, the city’s total population exceeded 19 million by 
2010.180 Similarly, in its comprehensive plan for 1999–2020, the Shanghai 
municipal government forecast a population of 18.5 million by 2020, 
whereas the city’s total population in 2013 was already more than 24 
million.181 Such population targets shape land use decisions by pretending 
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that housing demand is smaller than it actually is. 
Shenzhen is probably the most extreme case, with a planned 
population that lags far behind its actual population growth. In the city’s 
first comprehensive plan, the estimated population for 2000 was 840,000, a 
figure that was already far exceeded by 1994, when the population reached 
1.5 million. In the second comprehensive plan, issued in 1996, the 
projected population for 2010 was 4.3 million, whereas Shenzhen’s 
population in 2000 stood at 7 million.182 The city is currently home to more 
than 15 million people, although its current plan estimates a population of 
just 11 million by 2020.183 The population targets in these plans determine 
the planning of public transportation, public utilities, schools, hospitals, the 
police force, and many other public goods crucial to city functioning. 
Public services in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen have been planned in a 
way that is never going to meet the demands of their rapidly expanding 
populations, as evidenced by their public transportation systems, which are 
severely crowded relative to those of New York.184 
Detailed plans are used as a way to regulate land development and 
control the location and density of real estate projects, but they are not 
necessarily opposed to development. The success of individual projects 
depends on whether they serve planned city development goals or the 
preferences of city leaders. Newspaper reports on corrupt local government 
leaders often reveal the way in which they have used urban planning to 
facilitate their idiosyncratic ideas about urban development and/or favor 
one or a few developers to help them realize those ideas.185 Research on 
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https://thenanfang.com/shenzhen-subway-line-to-add-trains-during-rush-hours. 
 185. See, e.g., 从宿迁到昆明：商人刘卫高的“地”国 [From Suqian to Kunming: The “Land” 
  
504 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:467 
 
Beijing concluded that when a zoning amendment was directly ordered by 
a government leader, it had greater than 90 percent likelihood of approval. 
Compared with factors such as development density, location, and the 
nature of a project, government leaders’ instructions were the most 
significant factor in determining the result of zoning amendments, 
according to the same study.186 
B.  URBAN PLANNING COMMISSIONS AS PART OF THE GROWTH MACHINE 
To combat the arbitrariness of government-led development decisions, 
many Chinese cities have established urban planning commissions. 
Shenzhen was the first city to experiment with such a commission in 1998; 
this subsequently became a model for other. The Shenzhen Urban Planning 
Commission enjoys the power to review comprehensive plans and to 
approve detailed control plans (i.e., zoning maps). It has twenty-nine 
members, fourteen of them government officials, with the mayor serving as 
chair. The other government members are directors of relevant bureaus and 
urban district presidents. The fifteen non-government members are 
professors, real estate professionals and managers, urban planners, public 
utility company managers, and other community members. Decisions must 
be approved by two-thirds of attending members and no fewer than half the 
total number of commission members.187 
Such strict procedures are designed to confer legitimacy upon urban 
planning in Shenzhen. In theory, the rules are supposed to prevent the 
government or political leaders from dominating the planning process. In 
reality, however, the non-government commission members primarily raise 
easily resolved technical issues. Few people in the city would seriously 
challenge a project that city leaders had decided to push through. The non-
governmental members of the commission are selected to represent the 
general public interest, rather than special or particular interests.188 The 
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Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission is thus not designed as a forum for 
bargaining by various stakeholders, although in reality members from the 
real estate industry frequently promote their sector’s agenda in the name of 
public interest.189 
Even such limited public participation proved intolerable to the 
Shenzhen city government, with officials viewing it as too time-consuming 
and inefficient. From their perspective, city development could not wait for 
extensive reviews and discussions within the commission.190 As a result, 
the city government revised its urban planning regulations in 2001 and 
redrafted the Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission Charter.191 The reform 
provided for smaller special commissions—most notably the Commission 
on Zoning Maps, which is charged with approving detailed plans and any 
variations to them. This commission comprises nineteen members, nine of 
whom are also government employees of the Shenzhen Urban Planning, 
Land, and Resources Commission, a super-government bureau combining 
the powers of land administration and urban planning. Among the other ten 
members are urban planners and engineers from the Shenzhen Urban 
Planning Institute and other public institutions, environmental and 
agricultural officials, a professor from Shenzhen University, and a real 
estate appraiser. Given that nine of its members are from the Urban 
Planning, Land, and Resources Commission and some of its non-
governmental members are closely associated with them, the Commission 
on Zoning Maps is clearly dominated by the government, and has become 
an efficient agency for implementing city leaders’ business plans.192  In 
addition, faced with an increasing number of cases, the Shenzhen 
government has delegated part of its power to approve zoning amendments 
to the urban district planning bureaus to achieve greater efficiency.193 
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What we see in the Shenzhen case is a tradeoff between legitimacy 
and efficiency. Even a limited broadening of public participation reduced 
decision-making efficiency, and thus found itself in tension with city 
development. As the primary suppliers of land for housing, city 
governments in China also try to maximize their profits from the land 
market. Because most local government functions are funded through land 
sales, the land price that governments can secure is crucial to their 
sustainability. City governments thus create a “hungry supply” (i.e., an 
insufficient supply that is never able to catch up with demand) to push up 
land and housing prices in order to harvest monopoly rents from the 
market. The resulting skyrocketing housing prices have made the lives of 
cities’ middle- and low-income populations very difficult and, in many 
cases, pushed them out while also excluding potential incomers. 
To further reduce housing supply and drive up housing prices, city 
governments strictly control residential development density. According to 
urban planning rules, the highest floor-area ratio (“FAR”) for residential 
plots in Beijing is 2.8. 194  The corresponding figures for Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are 2.5,195  3.0,196  and 6.0, respectively.197  In 
comparison, the residential FAR in New York City can be 10 or even 
higher. 198  The first reason for city governments to limit residential 
development density is that they are concerned that high-rise residential 
buildings will attract too many residents, thereby exceeding the capacity of 
public facilities. The second reason is that they wish to control the total 
amount of available housing on the market in order to maintain high 
housing prices and, in turn, the high land prices which are crucial to 
government land-sales revenue. Let us think about a simple illustration. 
Suppose that a city mayor decides that the total amount of housing units 
should be limited to 1,000 during his term—the mayor can then choose to 
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sell 200 plots of land with a FAR of 5, or 500 plots of land with a FAR of 
2. The 200 plots of land may sell at a higher price per plot than the 500 
plots of land. But considering two additional factors, the total land sales 
revenue from the former is actually less than the latter: first, low-density 
housing is of higher price per unit; second, low-density housing puts much 
less burden on public infrastructure. Moreover, city governments always 
choose to sell more land rather than increase FAR, given their power to 
take land from farmers, with compensation equal to the agricultural value, 
and sell it to developers at a much higher price, reflecting the development 
value.199 
Real estate developers do lobby city governments for more density 
after they buy land from them. Like their counterparts in many other 
countries, real estate developers also invest in relationships with 
government officials, sometimes building up corrupt ties. However, even 
considering ex post adjustments and imperfect compliance, land use 
regulations in China still impose a highly restrictive constraint on urban 
land development. A recent empirical study investigated land developers’ 
compliance with FAR, using a unique set of 854 pairs of land parcels and 
corresponding residential development projects across thirty major Chinese 
cities. In 181 of these 854 cases, the land developers exceeded the 
regulatory upper limits set when the land parcels were acquired. “The 
developers adjusted the FAR upward in 21.2% of all the cases, covering 
approximately 25.2% of the total land area developed. . . . Including all 854 
cases, the total floor area was increased by 4.3% beyond the total 
regulatory limit due to upward adjustments of FAR.”200 The study also 
estimated that “there exists a significant gap between the FAR that 
maximizes the market land value and the regulatory FAR. . . ; “[c]orruption 
may facilitate an upward adjustment and reduce the gap, but only 
modestly.” 201  Overall, this first empirical study “suggests that FAR 
regulations have imposed a highly restrictive constraint on China’s urban 
land development even in the absence of strict compliance.”202 
Detailed plans also determine the ratios of industrial, commercial, and 
residential land. On average, industrial land occupies more than 20 percent 
of total buildable land in Chinese cities, a much greater percentage than in 
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other countries. 203  From 2009 to 2014, twelve major Chinese cities— 
including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen—zoned more than 
40 percent of their annual land supply for industrial use.204 Chinese cities 
have thus seen too much land zoned for industrial development and too 
little for residential development. Moreover, the development density of 
industrial land is often very low. According to the Chinese Ministry of 
Land and Resources, the FAR of industrial land in Chinese cities is about 
0.8, on average, whereas the figure ranges from 1.0–2.0 in developed 
countries. 205  Partial reasons include the unexamined assumptions that 
industrial companies require large factories and that it is infeasible to move 
large machines to tall buildings, although in many cases neither is true: 
many industrial companies do not require large machinery, and it is not 
always difficult to install such machinery in high-rises, as evidenced by 
Hong Kong and other places in which land is used more efficiently.206 
However, industrial investors have no incentive to make more efficient or 
intensive use of land that is assigned to them by the government cheaply, or 
even at no cost. A comparison of industrial land prices and the prices of 
other types of land reveals industrial land to be, on average, about one-sixth 
the price of residential land in 105 major Chinese cities.207  
In conclusion, the growth machine of Chinese cities is sufficiently 
powerful to control the decision-making processes of land use, and cities 
use that power to maximize land sale revenues and promote economic 
growth based on industrial development. The result has been a limited 
housing supply and controlled residential development density, which in 
turn contribute to skyrocketing housing prices and the exclusion of lower-
end housing consumers from megacities. 
C.  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: THE SLOW RISE OF A MOVEMENT 
China’s reforms have maintained the political structure of the party 
state while liberating the economic sector, allowing individuals to own 
housing and hold land use rights within a system of strict government 
control. In the wake of economic development and urbanization, though, 
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city management became more complicated, and the interests of various 
parties within a city are increasingly interconnected. Urban planning 
decisions increasingly affect the lives of property owners; combined with 
growing awareness of and sensitivity to property values, this has led to 
greater public participation in urban planning decisions. The Chinese 
central government’s role in this system is complex. Although supportive 
of local government autonomy, the central government sees public 
participation as a way of constraining abuses of power by local officials. As 
early as 2000, the then-Minister of Construction, Yu Zhensheng, 
emphasized the importance of public participation to urban planning.208 In 
2006, the Ministry of Construction promulgated urban planning ordinances 
that made public participation a principle of urban planning. The ministry 
also stipulated that urban planning drafts and detailed plan amendments 
must be open to public opinion and publicize the results of public surveys 
before the approval process could be completed.209 
At the local level, city governments view public participation as a way 
of promoting public acceptance of urban planning decisions, partly in 
response to bottom-up pressure. For example, the 2003 revision to the 
Shanghai’s urban planning regulations highlighted the importance of public 
participation and made listening to public opinion an urban planning 
requirement.210 More specifically, it required the city’s planning agency to 
publish detailed plans and organize meetings and hearings before 
submitting those plans for approval. The rules also stipulate that the city 
government should report to the city-level People’s Congress or its 
standing committee annually to strengthen the monitoring of urban 
planning.211  In the same year, Beijing’s urban planning committee also 
made an effort to institutionalize public participation practices by 
promulgating the Beijing City Interim Rules on Urban Planning 
Publicity. 212  From November to December 2004, the committee also 
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 209. See ZHENYU CHEN, 城市规划中的公众参与程序研究  [A RESEARCH ON THE PROCESS 
RELATED TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN URBAN PLANNING] 42–43 (2009). 
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(amended 2003)] (promulgated by the Shanghai Mun. People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Nov. 13, 
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publicized its draft of the revised Beijing City Comprehensive Plan to 
solicit public opinion. 213  In 2006, Shenzhen followed suit, again 
emphasizing the importance of public participation by soliciting public 
opinion on its comprehensive plan for 2020. It even changed the strategic 
positioning of several urban districts in response to public opinion.214 
These local initiatives culminated in the incorporation of public 
participation in the country’s 2007 Urban and Rural Planning Law 
(“URPL”), which for the first time established a national legal framework 
for such participation in urban planning.215 Article 26 of the URPL states 
that drafting agencies should make drafts of comprehensive plans available 
to the public for at least thirty days and organize meetings, discussions, 
hearings, or other forums to solicit both experts and public opinion.216 The 
agencies should then consider such opinions carefully and attach a relevant 
report in their submissions for approval. Recent changes to the URPL have 
given neighbors more influence over development decisions than they 
enjoyed in the past. The current rules require agencies proposing a zoning 
amendment to solicit the opinions of “parties of interest” (“PoIs”) in the 
area. They also conclude that detailed control plans—which impose 
specific restrictions on land development—directly affect the interests of 
those parties, and therefore their opinions are required before 
modification. 217  Another section of the URPL establishes the same 
requirement for variations to detailed building plans, and require that PoIs 
be compensated where zoning variances result in property value losses.218 
These stipulations in the URPL signal significant progress in public 
participation in Chinese urban planning. However, the limitations are also 
quite apparent. Comprehensive plans are often too broad and vague for 
meaningful public participation, whereas detailed control plans and zoning 
variations are limited to PoIs with a clear entitlement and specific interest 
 
 213. See Peng Xinqiong, 北京城市总体规划（2004–2020 年）昨起公示  [Beijing City 
Comprehensive Plan 2004–2020 Publicized Yesterday], NEWS 163 (Nov. 7, 2004, 2:09 AM), 
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 214. See Bing Zou et al., 从咨询公众到共同决策—深圳市城市总体规划全过程公众参与的实
践与启示 [From Public Consultation to Joint Decision-Making: Practice and Implications of Public 
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96 (2011). 
 215. See 中华人民共和国城乡规划法 [Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic 
of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008).  
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in judicial or administrative procedures.219 
1.  Impotent Public Participation in Comprehensive Plan Formulation 
As discussed above, comprehensive plans focus on the strategic 
positioning, grand goals, and plans of a city. They are drafted by 
professional urban planners, and are often too complex for individual 
participation. They represent the intention and will of city leaders, to be 
implemented by urban planners and legitimated to some extent by a veneer 
of public participation. It is argued here that public participation faces three 
main problems in drafting comprehensive plans. 
First, the timing of public participation comes quite late in the process. 
According to the URPL, public opinion should be solicited before the draft 
plan is submitted for approval. In other words, the plan has been drafted 
before any public input, and the public has limited options for making 
substantial changes to it. The drafting agency does not usually expect any 
overhaul of its draft plan. Urban planners use their own models, 
mechanisms, and terms in drafting comprehensive plans, and do not expect 
laypersons to understand the process, let alone engage in any meaningful 
participation. Individual complaints are often rejected with reference to the 
“science” of comprehensive plans and the interconnectedness of a city’s 
various goals within those plans. 
Second, comprehensive plans are generally too broad and too vague to 
foster substantial public participation. The URPL reflects a lack of clarity 
regarding the purpose of participation as well as who should participate. 
The URPL offers no clear definition of who constitutes the public in law— 
which means that anyone can participate in theory, but only certain 
members of the public have the capacity and motivation to engage in the 
process in practice. This lack a clearly defined explicit entitlement to public 
participation also results in a lack of structure for that participation. The 
primary avenue of participation—as in the U.S.—is public hearings. 
However, there are no clear rules for public hearings in China. Given the 
lack of guidance on who should participate, public hearings often turn into 
a public show put on by local government officials and the urban planning 
experts they invite. Hence, public participation is largely symbolic, 
especially given that members of the public are often less interested in 
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comprehensive plans than they are in specific neighborhood projects.220 
Finally, the URPL is unclear about the consequences of neglecting the 
public participation requirement. It simply requires a drafting agency to 
submit a report responding to public opinion without specifying any 
consequences sufficient to force meaningful participation. For all of these 
reasons, the so-called public participation movement has not lead to better 
urban planning. Nor has it changed the administrative-driven nature of 
urban planning or counterbalanced the influence of growth machine elites. 
2.  Zoning Maps and Adjustments: Housing Owners as Parties of Interest 
In contrast to the lack of clarity surrounding “the public,” PoIs have 
specific rights, including the right to request information on construction 
projects that might affect their interests and the right to initiate 
administrative (and even private) litigation if their property rights are 
violated.221 Both administrative and judicial agencies in China equate PoIs 
with housing owners. If you own an apartment in a neighboring area, you 
are by definition a PoI; if you do not, you cannot be a PoI.222 Considering 
that PoIs were already the most active participants in the drafting of 
comprehensive plans, the more specific rights and procedures they have 
been granted at the detailed-plan level afford them even greater power 
relative to non-property owners. However, PoIs in China are still not 
satisfied by the administrative and judicial protection of their property 
interests, and often engage in public protests when these interests are 
challenged. As a result, the limited progress achieved in public 
participation has been dominated by this rising class of property owners, 
who are sensitive to anything likely to diminish the value of their property, 
whether it be the rezoning of public land or open space as residential land 
or just the simple addition of more housing to their neighborhood. 
Accordingly, housing development in China’s megacities has become even 
more difficult to achieve than before, and urban planning decisions are 
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increasingly facing challenges.223  
For example, within the past decade the central government has 
developed a major plan for the construction of affordable housing and 
ordered city governments to build a certain amount of such housing in their 
jurisdictions. To avoid concentrating the poor in particular neighborhoods 
and districts, the Ministry of Construction has further promoted a mixture 
of affordable housing with regular commercial residential housing. 
However, these efforts have been met with a number of challenges from 
existing property owners. For instance, a 2008 affordable housing proposal 
in the Xu Jiahui district of Shanghai was originally planned for a central 
area, to promote the integration of people from different social and 
economic backgrounds and to avoid the segregation of rich and poor. The 
proposal passed with little difficulty (probably due in part to limited public 
participation), but once the project got underway, more than 6,000 
households in the neighboring residential district rose up in protest. 224 
These property owners first argued that the project would occupy land that 
had originally been planned for a healthcare facility, senior center, and 
kindergarten. In response, the government explained that those public 
facilities would be included in the affordable housing project and open to 
all of those living nearby. The property owners then claimed that the 
project might influence the natural light and air quality in the 
neighborhood. What was their real concern? As one resident explained in 
the aftermath, “We were concerned that low prices and [a] low-income 
population would pull down housing prices [in] the three [surrounding] 
neighborhoods.” 225  The pressure that property owners exerted through 
institutional channels, such as the local People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, resulted in the Shanghai city government relocating the project 
to a more remote area.226 
This case illustrates the national debate over the concept of mixed 
living for the rich and poor (pinfu hunju). The Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development promotes such mixed living, requiring real 
estate developers to incorporate a certain percentage of affordable housing 
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into their projects to avoid concentrations of the poor in particular regions. 
However, both real estate developers and high-income residents have 
expressed opposition to this policy. As one such resident from Lanzhou in 
Gansu province explained, “I paid a large amount of money for housing 
exactly for its environment and surroundings; it’s good for us and for our 
children’s education.”227 Property owners’ concerns over property values, 
which are inseparable from existing neighborhood characteristics, have 
contributed to the rise of the NIMBY movement in China. It has become 
increasingly common for middle-class property owners to challenge urban 
planning decisions, sometimes through public protests. NIMBY 
movements across the country have forced local governments to take 
existing property owners’ interests more seriously, though the political and 
social impact of such movements on Chinese urban governance is yet to be 
fully examined.228 To date, the movement has attracted public attention 
primarily with respect to environmental issues, as in the case of opposition 
to the construction of nearby chemical factories or garbage-disposal 
sites.229 
Community opposition thus far has been separate from public 
participation. Unlike their American counterparts, local communities in 
China have little institutional power in the urban planning process. Under 
Chinese law, public participation is incapable of accommodating and 
dealing with community opposition, which is why such opposition is 
mainly presented politically, in the form of public protest. However, such 
protests have proved a powerful weapon in slowing down government-
planned development projects, owing to the government’s concern with 
social stability.230 Overall, the NIMBY movement in China has not made 
cities more inclusive, but rather has strengthened the government’s already 
existing inclination to exclude newcomers who would impose a burden on 
public services or create a nuisance for neighboring property owners. 
The voices of newcomers and citizens without property are completely 
 
 227. See Xiao Wenxin & Li Kainan, 媒体调查称兰州高低收入者均不满贫富混居政策 [Those 
with High or Low Incomes Are All Dissatisfied with the Policies of Mixed Rich and Poor Residences], 
SINA NEWS (Oct. 8, 2010, 12:17 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-08-10/001720860323.shtml. 
 228. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 54, at 431; Sun, supra note 54, at 133, 136.  
 229. See, e.g., 近年新建大项目受到周边居民反对事件一览（包括 PX 事件） [Those Incidents 
That Received Opposition from Nearby Residents in Recent Years (Including the PX Incident)], IFENG 
(Sept. 20, 2014, 2:24 AM), http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140920/13131025_0.shtml; Chen Yang, 东莞
樟木头上百村民散步抗议建垃圾焚烧厂 [Hundreds of Villagers Protested the Construction of a 
Waste Incineration Plant in Zhangmutou, Dongguan], SOUTHCN (Mar. 29, 2010, 9:11 AM), 
http://news.southcn.com/g/2010-03/29/content_10554085.htm. 
 230. Johnson, supra note 54, at 436; Sun, supra note 54, at 136. 
  
2018] EXCLUSIONARY MEGACITIES 515 
 
absent from the urban planning process. For example, bargaining in urban 
renewal, which has become an increasingly important means of city 
development, occurs primarily between growth machine elites—
government officials, real estate developers, and property owners—with 
the interests of the majority of residents in blighted neighborhoods—
namely, renters—receiving little, if any, consideration. In Shenzhen, eight 
million residents of intra-city villages (villages within the city) are 
migrants, and most of their landlords do not live in those villages.231 When 
intra-city villages are targeted for redevelopment, their migrant worker 
residents (generally taxi drivers, factory workers, cleaning staff, security 
guards, and the like) are forced to move to another village. 232  If the 
Shenzhen government succeeds in redeveloping all such villages, migrant 
workers will have nowhere to live. 
To summarize, urban governance in China is dominated by growth 
elites, including government officials who pursue industrial-driven 
economic growth, financial investors, and real estate developers. The 
decision-making mechanism is administratively driven and allows little 
democratic deliberation or public input. The resulting growth machine has 
little sympathy for the young and the poor. Combined with the 
conventional hukou regime, land use regulations have become an 
increasingly important weapon for Chinese cities to exclude the unwanted. 
The rise of homeownership in China was supposed to balance the power of 
local governments, but only to the limited extent of protecting existing 
property owners’ interests. For the non-property owners in Chinese cities, 
Chinese NIMBYism operates similarly to its U.S. counterpart, serving to 
limit the housing supply and shore up housing prices by slowing down or 
pushing out development. 
IV.  HOUSING, THE NEW EXCLUSION, AND THE WAY OUT 
Our research reveals that two very different systems—with very 
different legal frameworks, governmental structures, and goals—can each 
produce exclusionary housing policies that limit the construction of 
affordable housing where it is needed. The role of property owners in 
preventing development has widespread implications for society that go far 
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beyond the issues of exclusion and inconvenience for developers. In recent 
years, a growing number of economists have begun to focus on the rapidly 
escalating cost of housing in many American cities—particularly coastal 
cities, where housing prices have risen dramatically—forcing many people 
to relocate. Jason Furman, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors 
under President Obama, has written: 
[S]ome land use regulations can be beneficial to communities and the
overall economy. There can be compelling environmental reasons in
some localities to limit high-density or multi-use development. . . . But
in other cases, zoning regulations and other local barriers to housing
development allow a small number of individuals to capture the
economic benefits of living in a community, thus limiting diversity and
mobility. The artificial upward pressure that zoning places on house
prices—primarily by functioning as a supply constraint—also may
undermine the market forces that would otherwise determine how much
housing to build, where to build, and what type to build, leading to a
mismatch between the types of housing that households want, what they
can afford, and what is available to buy or rent.233 
Furman’s analysis relies on the work of Edward Glaeser, Joseph 
Gyorko, and Raven Saks, who concluded that zoning regulations in New 
York City increase the cost of housing there by 50 percent.234 And high 
housing costs, as Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag have argued, are largely 
responsible for hindering the migration of Americans from lower-wage to 
higher-wage regions.235 
In both the U.S. and China, the impact of overly restrictive 
development approaches has contributed to gentrification, as consumers 
seek housing in previously undesirable neighborhoods, with developers 
following close behind. As John Mangin has argued, zoning restrictions 
that prevent development in high-income areas push home-seekers to 
expand their targets to adjacent neighborhoods.236 The result is a rise in 
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housing costs there, which attracts developers—and a backlash from long-
term residents concerned about being priced out of the area. However, 
efforts to stop development do little to prevent increases in housing costs, 
which are the result of demand rather than construction.237 
In the remainder of this Article, we first discuss some of the 
commonalities and differences between the U.S. and China with regard to 
land use regulation in fast-growing cities. We then discuss several 
proposals made by other academics for dealing with exclusion in the 
context of urban development, and argue for replacing property-based 
urban governance with citizenship-based urban governance. 
A.  U.S. AND CHINESE LAND USE REGULATION: CONVERGENCE TOWARD 
EXCLUSION? 
As this Article reveals, the political systems in both the U.S. and 
China have imposed limits on high-density development. To an American 
visiting China, the claim that the country’s cities are “anti-density” may 
seem odd. After all, Chinese cities have many more high-rise apartments 
than American cities. And unlike in the U.S., it is true that the predominant 
living style in Chinese urban culture is apartment-dwelling, often in large 
buildings. However, as we have demonstrated herein, Chinese local 
governments often thwart the even-higher-density developments for which 
there is considerable demand. The fact that land sales account for a 
significant portion of local government budgets pushes those governments 
to transform additional rural land into developable residential areas instead 
of focusing their efforts on increasing the development of already-built-up 
areas, leading to the rapid sprawl seen in many cities. In the U.S., 
opposition to density is the fundamental position of most homeowners, as 
we have seen in the New York City cases. Historically, such opposition—a 
cause of deconcentration, or sprawl—has been less important than 
suburban opposition to development. However, should urban homeowner 
opposition continue apace, we can expect increased demand for new 
developments in exurban areas. 
High on the list of reasons for opposing density in both the U.S. and 
China is concern for the additional infrastructure costs that density 
imposes. Concerns over overcrowding in schools, parks, and other public 
facilities, as well as over the potentially high costs of improving and 
expanding infrastructure, generate public opposition and government 
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obstruction to new development in both countries. In addition, explicit and 
implicit fears over income mixing have also shaped opposition to higher-
density housing. In the U.S., “snob zoning” is an old phenomenon. In fact, 
land use regulation in the West—from Euclid onwards—has been based in 
large part on the principle of separation of income levels. In China, this is a 
rather new phenomenon, but, as we have seen, exclusionary communities 
are becoming prevalent in the country’s largest cities. 
Housing markets in China and the U.S., albeit different in many ways, 
are exhibiting signs of convergence. This Article has focused on the 
housing debate in both countries’ fast-growing cities, but such “weak 
market” cities as Ordos and Qinzhou in China238 and Detroit and St. Louis 
in the U.S. feature a glut of affordable housing. In the U.S., that glut is the 
result of demographic changes in these and similar cities. People have 
moved in search of better economic opportunities, leaving their housing 
behind. In China, such oversupply is the result of poorly planned 
construction projects that were not based on market demand.  
Despite dramatically different fundamental frameworks, the U.S. and 
China are also converging toward the same exclusionary results. In China, 
control of land use decisions remains concentrated in local government 
hands. Although real estate developers have some influence, government 
leaders make the decisions about what gets built and where. In the U.S., 
government regulators, private property owners, and developers vie for 
power in both short-term disputes over individual projects and long-term 
debates over the appropriate level of construction. Although governments 
in the U.S. have the power to reject proposals, and therefore shape 
development, they do not generally plan and/or initiate housing 
developments. However, even with concentrated power in China and 
dispersed power in the U.S., the end result in the megacities of both is a 
decision to limit growth.  
Additionally, in the U.S., public participation is a fundamental aspect 
of the development process. New York City is a typical example. Its 
property owners and their representative organizations wield significant 
power in shaping both the general zoning map and decision-making about 
individual development projects. In China, public participation is limited, 
and has historically been directed toward input on general plans. However, 
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the situation is changing, with public opposition to development seemingly 
on the rise. 
Finally, the types of markets and goals of government decision-
makers certainly differ in the two countries. In China, industrial 
development often takes priority over residential development. In the U.S., 
opposition to residential development is strong among residents and 
government officials because of concerns over the costs of increased 
density. Industrial development is less of a priority in American cities, 
which are generally older, with existing (and underutilized) industrial areas 
already in place. However, in both countries the fundamental structure of 
the property system is based almost exclusively on the interests of current 
property owners. In China, much of the land remains owned by the 
government. The transfer of land to private parties has brought about new 
development, but not enough to meet demand. In the U.S., private land 
ownership is the norm, but private property owners’ incentives to limit 
competition for resources and to maintain property values point toward 
exclusion. Our research leads us to conclude that more equitable land use 
regulatory regimes require the conscious inclusion of non-property owners 
in the planning and development process. Neither a public nor a private 
system that places power solely in the hands of property owners will ever 
produce the necessary amount of housing. 
B.  TOWARD A NEW, INCLUSIONARY REGULATORY SYSTEM 
The value of cities, according to agglomeration economics, is that they 
are able to share information, talent, public transportation, education, 
healthcare systems, and other public goods. Sharing and more inclusive 
cities are more efficient than exclusionary cities, as they ensure that 
developments benefit from the greater availability of human capital, 
governments benefit from more taxes, and citizens (both old and new) 
benefit from more information, communication, services, and 
opportunities. That is how cities have grown over time and why we 
consider them the greatest invention of civilization. 239  Recognizing the 
importance of cities to human development, people also share a vision of 
“cities for all,” to be achieved, as the U.N. General Assembly resolved, “by 
leveraging the agglomeration benefits of well-planned urbanization, high 
productivity, competitiveness and innovation, by promoting full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, [and] by ensuring the 
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creation of decent jobs and equal access for all to economic and productive 
resources and opportunities.”240 Fundamental to the core of inclusive cities, 
of course, is “a variety of adequate housing options.”241  
However, as exemplified by the comparative study reported herein, 
vested interests in both American and Chinese megacities have accelerated 
their exclusionary tendencies. To address the failure of the political markets 
regarding land use regulations in megacities, we can either abolish zoning 
altogether 242  or empower non-property owners in the decision-making 
process of zoning. Abolishment of zoning would theoretically enable 
landowners to “develop their property in the manner they desire[].”243 But 
the question is whether landowners desire the same amount of housing as 
do potential consumers—in particular the middle- and lower-end 
consumers. As discussed previously, this is not necessarily the case. 
Moreover, the expansion of government in Chinese and American 
metropolitan areas has rendered this solution very difficult, if not entirely 
infeasible. The other approach—empowering those whose interests are not 
protected by the current system—is thus more practical. Land use 
regulations have become more necessary than they were a century ago 
because of interconnectedness and the agglomeration of economic and 
social activities in cities. However, that does not preclude the possibility of 
redefining the boundaries of the political market of urban governance. A 
more balanced approach may be to facilitate equal access and participation 
in the political market by creating neighborhood plans that set general 
parameters for development while leaving individual development 
decisions to individual property owners, supplemented by private remedies. 
The essential component of this approach is to clearly define the 
boundaries of the political market and the entitlements of its participants. 
Urban governance regimes are shaped by city politics, increasingly 
dominated by private owners in the U.S. and by public ones in China. 
There are few meaningful mechanisms to welcome newcomers, 
traditionally the primary source of cities’ greatness. These problems cannot 
be resolved solely by technical revisions of democratic procedures; they 
can be resolved only by changing the composition of political 
representation. Newcomers to cities must be afforded more power to shape 
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land use regulations. Changing the number and composition of participants 
could well reshape the urban governance landscape. Empowering absent 
stakeholders is of more fundamental importance than effecting technical 
amendments to land use procedures and regulations. Zoning budgets and 
city-level discussions can improve the situation by limiting the influence of 
local community opposition, but they will not shift the city dynamics from 
pro status quo to pro housing development.  
In his celebrated article, Suburban Growth Controls, Ellickson 
addresses how to protect housing consumers against monopoly pricing.244 
His proposal is to grant housing consumers legal rights: more specifically, 
an entitlement to initiate antitrust class actions, using the threat of damages 
to deter housing owners from exercising monopoly control over zoning.245 
In the spirit of incorporating housing consumers into the bargaining 
process, we propose to restructure the political market for urban 
governance to bring housing consumers into the political market, and to 
entitle them to participate in zoning decisions. Doing so would mean 
changing the current tripartite urban planning framework to a four-party 
framework. 
In future work, we plan to develop a way to incorporate non-property 
owners into the political system.246 However, we suggest several first steps. 
In essence, urban governance regimes must give non-property owners and 
their representatives, as well as NGOs that build and advocate for 
affordable housing, a substantive voice and power in the process of 
deciding overall land uses and urban development densities. For example, 
governments in both China and the U.S. could consider establishing 
community involvement commissions at the city level to formally represent 
low-income populations, homeless residents, and renters in the urban 
planning process.247  
Empirical studies have revealed that exit cannot replace voice in 
shaping policy change.248 Meltzer and Schuetz’s analysis of policy changes 
in 100 Bay Area cities and towns between 1998 and 2003 reveals that 
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“political factors, such as partisan affiliation and the strength of affordable 
housing nonprofits, are more robust predictors [than economic and spatial 
factors] of whether or not a local government adopts inclusionary 
zoning.”249 In other policy areas, such as environmental protection, we also 
see the importance of political participation. Portney and Berry’s survey of 
city councilors and administrators in fifty large American cities shows that 
“contact with different group sectors and degree of inclusiveness of those 
sectors in policymaking is linked to policymakers’ support for 
environmental protection and for sustainability.”250 Successful urban policy 
changes are shaped much more by advocacy and participation than by 
choosing to leave. Therefore, the next step is to figure out a plan for giving 
housing consumers equal access to decision-making in land use control and 
urban governance. 
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